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RECENT DECISIONS
THE STANDARD OF CARE OF A VEHICLE OPERATOR CROSSING RAILROAD
TRACKS, CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AND ITS EFFECTS.-Thc car driven by
the plaintiff's decedent crashed into the front of the defendant's engine
as it was proceeding slowly over a grade crossing. Plaintiffs brought an
action based on negligence. The railroad defended on the basis of the
contributory negligence of the deceased. The jury returned a verdict of
$170,000 for the plaintiffs. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
held, reversed. The jury should have been instructed as requested by de-
fendant: "That railway tracks and highway signs that indicate the pres-
ence of railroad crossing are themselves warnings of danger, and if you
find from the evidence that . . . [the deceased] failed to look and listen
for approaching trains, and to stop before driving onto the tracks, if this
was necessary to make his looking and listening for approaching trains
effective, he was guilty of negligence which contributed to his injury,
and your verdict must be in favor of the defendants."' O'Brien v. Great
No. Ry., 400 P.2d 634 (Mont. 1965).
Negligence has been defined as "conduct . . . which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against un-
reasonable risk of harm."2 "Contributory negligence is conduct on the
part of the plaintiff which falls below the standard to which he should
conform for his own protection and which is a legally contributing cause,
co-operating with the negligence of the defendant in bringing about the
plaintiff's harm." 3 In both theories the conduct is compared to that of a
reasonably prudent man similarly situated. The duty or standard is a
function of the likelihood of harm and the seriousness of the injury should
the harm be incurred, weighed against the value of the interest which
must be sacrificed to avoid the danger. The question of negligence or
contributory negligence is generally for the jury. But where reasonable
minds could not differ or where statutes prescribe the duty, it is a matter
of law to be laid down by the courts.4 To have a positive effect in an
action, the negligence or contributory negligence must be a proximate
cause of the injury sustained.
As a general rule, contributory negligence operates as a complete
defense in a personal injury action.3 The plaintiff's conduct under the
'Error also occurred in the admission of the testimony of plaintiffs' witness, the
highway patrolman who investigated the accident. He was not familiar with stopping
distances in terms of speed. He expressed doubts about his ability to judge con-
clusively. Moreover, due to the impact there was no way to determine the speed of
the vehicle from the skid marks of 662 feet on the highway. This witness testified
that in his opinion, the decedent was not exceeding the speed limit. As he was testify-
ing as an expert witness and the jury might have accorded the testimony considerable
weight it was held prejudicial.
-RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 282 (1934).
'Id. at § 463.
'Id. at § 285.
5Id. at § 467.
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circumstances of the particular case does not conform to the standard
required for his own protection. He is, therefore, denied the recovery to
which the negligence of the defendant would otherwise have entitled him.
An example of the operation of this rule is found in an 1809 English case,
cited as the first contributory negligence decision.6 The defendant had
negligently placed a pole across a road, and the plaintiff, "who was rid-
ing violently," rode against it, fell with his horse, and was severely in-
jured. It was said that if the plaintiff "had used ordinary care he must
have seen the obstruction; so that the accident appeared to happen en-
tirely from his own fault. One person being in fault will not dispense
with another's using ordinary care for himself."
7
Recognition of the inherent dangers involved in railway crossings
led to the adoption of specific standards of conduct which travelers using
the crossings were bound to follow. One such standard was laid down
by the Pennsylvania court in adopting the so called stop-look-and-listen
rule:
At the place of intersection there are concurrent rights. Neither
the traveler on the common highway nor the railroad company
has an exclusive right of passage. Even on a common road,
travellers must look out for the approach of other vehicles pass-
ing. And this is more necessary at a railroad crossing, because
the movement upon such a road is more speedy, and because the
consequences of a collision are usually so disastrous. Precau-
tion, looking out for danger, is therefor a duty .... "The traveller
has the obligation of prudence upon him; he is bound to stop
and look out for trains. . . .
This duty to stop was imposed by law. Therefore, the failure to do so
was not merely evidence of negligence, but was negligence per se.9
In Balitmore & 0. R. R. v. Goodman,10 Mr. Justice Holmes imposed
the strictest standard of conduct required of travelers at grade cross-
ings. He stated that the driver must stop, and get out of his vehicle if
necessary to determine whether a train was dangerously near. He ap-
plied his philosophy that "when the standard is clear, it should be laid
down once for all by the Court."" Seven years later Mr. Justice Cardozo
rejected that fixed standard, envisioning the possibility of catastrophic
results of requiring the driver to leave his vehicle.
Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected
to tests or regulations that are fitting for the common-place or
normal. In default of the guide of customary conduct, what is
6Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East. 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
7 d. at 927.
8North Pa. R.R. v. Heileman, 49 Pa. 60, 64 (1865).
'Pennsylvania E.R. v. Aiken, 130 Pa. 330, 18 Atl. 619 (1889).
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suitable for the traveler caught in the mesh where the ordinary
safeguards fail him is for the judgment of the jury.12
There are really two phases to this problem; the determination of
the standard of care required of the trave]er from the existence of the
crossing, and the application of that standard to the traveler's conduct.
In the instant case, the deceased's conduct under the circumstances was
not such as to constitute, as a matter of law, contributory negligence.
He could not be held to a standard of care required by facts and circum-
stances of which he was not aware. 13 Thus, the court in the instant case
determined that the instruction setting forth the standard of care should
have been given. The question of the deceased's conduct in relation to
that standard was a question of fact for the jury.
The rules which formulate the standard of care required at grade
crossings in Montana were summarized by the Montana Supreme Court
in the instant case:
The presence of a railroad track is of itself a warning of danger;
a person approaching a railroad crossing is required to take all
reasonable precautions to assure himself by actual observation
that there is no danger from an approaching train; the failure of
the persons in charge of the train to give warning signal of its
approach to the crossing does not relieve the traveler of the
necessity of making vigilant use of his senses to ascertain wheth-
er it is safe to proceed; the traveler must use ordinary care to
make his looking and listening reasonably effective. It may also
be said that whenever it appears that there is a zone of safety
within which a traveler upon a highway, may by looking or lis-
tening and stopping to do so if need be, ascertain the presence of
an oncoming train, it is his duty to make his observation within
such zone. If he proceeds from the place of safety regardless
of an approaching train of which he has knowledge, or if he
leaves the place of safety without having made vigilant use of
his senses to discover a danger which is present and could have
been seen from such place, then it will be held to be his negli-
gence which is the proximate cause of an injury resulting from
a collision regardless of circumstances tending to show negli-
gence on the part of the railroad operators.' 4
"Fokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934).
"This is true if his failure to comprehend the situation was not through his fault, but
resulted from the neglect of a duty imposed on, or assumed by the railroad. In the
instant case, the duty of the railroad to station a flagman at the crossing was admitted
by the pleadings although it seems the imposition of this duty was otherwise open
to question. Instant case at 640.
"Instant case at 641, quoting from an earlier decision, Roberts v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry., 67 Mont. 472, 479, 216 Pac. 332, 334 (1923). In saying that 'it will be held to
be his negligence which is the proximate cause of an injury. . . " the Court seems
to be treating proximate cause as the basis for contributory negligence. As will be
discussed later, the contributory ngligence involved does not meet the normally
accepted requirements of a superseding cause.
1965]
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Montana imposes a statutory duty on travelers to stop when a train ap-
proaching a highway crossing gives an audible signal and the train, by
reason of its speed or nearness to the crossing is an immediate hazard.15
M oreover, where the crossing is outside the limits of an incorporated city
or town and a flagman or mechanical warning device is not maintained,
if the view is obstructed or an approaching train is within sight or hear-
ing, then travelers must stop before crossing the tracks.1 6 Although a
statute requires the use of whistles and bells at grade crossings17 and
even though the public has a right to rely on such signals, the failure of
the railroad to give them does not excuse a citizen from using at least
ordinary diligence and prudence:
[I]f one, upon approaching a railroad crossing, intending to
pass over it, fails to make a vigilant use of his senses,-that is,
to look or listen, and to stop for this purpose, if necessary, to
learn if there is danger,-and by reason of this failure to exercise
this precaution he is injured, then he contributes directly to such
injury, and cannot be heard to say that the railroad company
did him the injury .... I
If the situation is such that if the driver had used his senses he could not
have failed to have seen or heard the approaching train at a point where
he was in perfect safety, his failure to so exercise his senses amounts to
negligence.' 9 This negligence, although not the sole cause of the acci-
dent, as a matter of law bars recovery. 20 If the facts and circumstances
shown by the evidence of the plaintiff's own case are such as to raise a
presumption that he was not at the time in the exercise of due care, he
will have the burden of going forward with the evidence on the point.




If the railroad fails to give the warnings prescribed by statute, and
this negligence is a proximate cause of the injury, the contributory negli-
gence of the driver nevertheless operates as a total bar to recovery.22
15
REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 32-2191. (Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MON-
TANA are cited R.C.M.)
6 R.C.M. 1947, § 72-164.
17
-. C.M. 1947, § 72-219.
'"Hunter v. Montana Cent. Ry., 22 Mont. 525, 57 Pac. 140, 142 (1899). Again in this
quotation, the language used by the Court seems to indicate the improper use of
proximate cause as a basis for contributory negligence.
9Monforton v. Northern Pac. Ry., 138 Mont. 191, 355 P.2d 501, 506 (1960). In this
case, the road was level and it was a clear day with good visibility. The driver had
an unobstructed view of the tracks and if he had looked the train would have been
visible to him for about a mile prior to the collision.
'Great No. Ry. v. Taulbee, 92 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1937).
'Rau v. Northern Pac. Ry., 87 Mont. 521, 289 Pac. 580 (1930). In this case, the
deceased started across the tracks after the passage of one train, and was struck by
a second coming in the opposite direction on the track beyond.
nR.C.M. 1947, § 72-219.
[Vol. 26,
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This is true regardless of the relative deviations from the respetive stand-
ards of care. However, the language of the courts in many of the grade
crossing cases indicates that the courts fail to differentiate between the
theories of intervening cause and contributory negligence. Contributory
negligence is somewhat analogous to the situation of joint tort-feasors,
where the negligence of both actors is the proximate cause of the injury.23
On the other hand, where the intervening cause is present, it serves to
break the causal chain between the negligence of one of the parties and
the injury. It generally contemplates a subsequent action by a third
person or a natural occurrence not arising or forseeable from the actor's
negligence. 24 The crossing accident is the normally forseeable conse-
quence involved in the railroad's failure to give adequate warnings. The
traveler approaching the crossing is the very focus of this duty. The
negligence of the traveler in failing to observe the approaching train
concurs with rather than supersedes the negligence of the railroad in fail-
ing to give the warning. Thus the negligence of both are substantial
factors in bringing about the resulting damage.
Three factors have been influential in the development of the doc-
trine of contributory negligence 25 since the first reported case in 1809:26
first, a desire to protect new industries by controlling their potential lia-
bilities in trials before supposedly plaintiff-minded juries; second, the
desire to find a single dominant cause of the loss; and third, the diffi-
culty of apportioning the loss fairly among the parties. Many juries,
judges and legislatures do not favor the defense of contributory negli-
gence because of its harsh and unsatisfactory results.27 The loss sustained
in an accident is arbitrarily placed on the plaintiff, regardless of the fault
of the other party. Generally the plaintiff is least able to bear the loss.
Moreover, the contributory negligence rule does not have the socially
dsirable effect of deterring substandard conduct. The risk of economic
loss will not discourage negligent conduct where the far more serious con-
sequences common in crossing accidents has failed. On the other hand,
the imposition of the loss on the railroad would tend to make safety
measures, such as better supervision of train crews, the installation of
mechanical warning devices and construction of under or over passes,
economically more feasible. The railroad has a broad market over which
to spread these costs. Where the negligence of the railroad has been a
"Thus, where the railroad is negligent in failing to provide an adequate warning
system so that a traveler unfamiliar with the crossing, due to the negligence of the
railroad, collides with the train and is injured, the negligence of the railroad is the
proximate cause of the injury and it is liable. If the traveler is familiar with the
crossing or is aware of its existence, but fails to look and listen and if necessary
stop to effectuate his looking and listening, then this negligence is also a proximate
cause of the injury. The negligence of both contributes to the injury. This con-
tributory negligence still operates as a complete defense and will bar the traveler's
recovery.
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 440-443 (1934).
2'PROSSER, TORTS § 64 (1964).
'Supra note 5.
"'For many years, juries have been deciding cases just as though there was no such
rule of law." IULMAN, A JUDGE TAKES THE STAND 31 (1933).
1965]
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contributing cause of the accident, a more desirable result might be ob-
tained by imposing liability of the railroad, rather than to allow it to
have a windfall. However, except for some limited areas such as work-
men's compensation, 28 the law has not been willing to totally disregard
the plaintiff's contributory fault.
Genefal comparative negligence statutes providing for the appor-
tionment of damages according to the fault of the parties in negligence
actions, have been adopted in a few jurisdictions.2 1 Under these statutes,
contributory negligence only mtitgates damages, whereas a superseding
cause still remains a total bar to recovery. The determination of relative
fault complicates the problem for the triers of fact, but the result, even
if merely an approximation, is more equitable than the total bar of the
contributory negligence rule.30 To insure that juries do not award total
damages without deducting for the plaintiff's fault, the device of the
special verdict has been used.
The comparative negligence theory has also been used in special
situations. Most admiralty courts apportion the loss resulting from col-
lisions in proportion to the fault of each of the ships involved. 3' Work-
man's compensation legislation commonly provides that the contributory
negligence of the injured employee should not bar recovery, but that dam-
ages should be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the employee.3 2 Similar provisions in Florida33 and Vir-
ginia 3 4 apply to grade crossing accidents arising from the failure of the
train to give the proper signals. Even under these statutes, where testi-
mony conflicted as to whether the statutory signals were given, the courts
have sometimes found that the negligence of the driver approaching the
crossing was the sole proximate cause of the injury,35 and that applica-
tion of the comparative negligence statutes was not proper.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 92-201.
'Under a pure comparative negligence statute, if the plaintiff was 25 percent at fault
and the defendant 75 percent, and the loss sustained by the plaintiff was $100, the
plaintiff would be allowed to recover $75. If both parties suffered loss, the damages of
both parties axe totaled and each party's share of the loss is determined by their share
of the fault. The computation could get complicated with three or more parties all
suffering damage and all at fault. For many years admiralty courts divided damages
equally. Since the Brussels Maritime Convention of 1909-10, however, courts generally
apportion loss in proportion with the fault of each ship involved in a collision. Turk,
Comparative Negligence On The March, 28 CHI.-KE NT L. REV. 189, 230 (1950). Mis-
sissippi, Georgia, Nebraska, Wisconsin, South Dakota and Arkansas have adopted
general comparative negligence statutes. Nebraska and South Dakota limit recovery
to cases where the negligence of the plaintiff is ''slight'' while that of the defendant
is "gross" in comparison. Arkansas, Georgia, and Wisconsin limit recovery to situa-
tions where the plaintiff's negligence is not as great as that of the defendant. See
PROSSER, TORTS § 66 (1964).
30Some suspect that juries manage to apportion damages according to fault, even
without an authorizing statute. PROSSEE, TORTS § 66 (1964).
"'Supra note 29.
'
2R.C.M. 1947, § 72-649 dealing with railroad employees is an example.
mFLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.06 (1963).
34VA. CODE ANN. § 56-416 (1950).
'Myers v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 86 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1956); Southern Ry. v. Barden,
200 Va. 98, 104 S.E.2d 13 (1958).
[Vol. 26,
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The standard of care laid out by the court in the instant case is of
itself reasonable. The existence of a grade crossing should elicit caution
from the motorist encountering it. The precautions of looking and lis-
tening, and even stopping when necessary are slight burdens on the trav-
eler when compared to the consequences of meeting a train upon the
crossing. The application of the standard to particular fact situations
presents problems. If contributory negligence operates as a complete de-
fense, the failure of courts to distinguish between the theories of inter-
vening cause and contributory negligence will not affect the outcome of
a particular case. Both theories would operate to deny recovery. How-
ever, if the comparative negligence doctrine is applicable, the distinction
is important. If contributory negligence is treated as an intervening
cause, it will still operate as a total bar to recovery. Properly viewed,
the negligence of each of the parties should be treated as a proximate
cause, with contributory negligence merely serving to mitigate damages.
LAWRENCE H. SVERDRUP.
DECISION OF INDIAN TRIBAL COURT HELD REvIEWABLE THROUGH FED-
ERAL DISTRICT COURT HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDING.-An Indian woman
sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court claiming she was
illegally detained by order of the Court of Indian Offenses, Ft. Belknap
Jurisdiction, United States Indian Service. The district court held it had
no jurisdiction to determine the legality of the decision. On appeal to
federal circuit court, Held: Remanded to district court for a hearing on its
merits. Although Indian tribal courts have been considered courts of in-
dependent sovereigns over which federal courts had no jurisdiction, the
Indian court in question was in fact an arm of the federal government.
The federal district court, in a habeas corpus proceeding had jurisdic-
tion to inquire into the legality of the tribal court's decision. Colliflower
v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965).
Federal courts have consistently held that they have no jurisdiction
over Indian tribal courts. The rationale for this is as follows:
(1) An Indian tribe possessed, in the first instance, all the powers
of any sovereign state. (2) Conquest rendered the tribe subject
to the legislative power of the United States and, in substance,
terminated the external powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g.,
its power to enter into treaties with foreign nations, but did not
by itself terminate the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its
powers of local self-government. (3) These internal powers were,
of course, subject to qualification by treaties and by express
legislation of Congress, but save as thus expressly qualified, many
powers of internal sovereignty have remained in Indian tribes
and in their duly constituted organs of government.'
'DnP'T OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 398 (1958)
(hereinafter cited as FEDERAL INDIAN LAW).
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